Objects are not a threat - People are the threat

> At a Senate oversight hearing today, Transportation Security Administration head John Pistole explained that TSA agents really do need to [encounter testicular resistance](http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/10/assume-the-position-tsa-begins-new-ball-busting-patdowns.ars) when performing their newly enhanced airport pat-downs. Since switching to the new pat-downs in the last few weeks, “We have detected dozens and dozens of, let’s say, ‘artfully concealed objects'” that could pose a risk to flight, said Pistole. > > Indeed, the government’s own covert penetration testing of airports showed that it wasn’t difficult to get contraband into airports under the old regime, thanks in large part to this “artful concealment.” Those tests showed that the US was “not being thorough enough in our pat-downs,” said Pistole. When combined with 2009’s “underwear bomber” case, it became clear to TSA that something much more aggressive (though short of a cavity search) would be required. > > Pistole faced surprisingly gentle questioning from senators of both parties, even though most admitted that their own phones were ringing off the hook on the issue. “We’re getting hundreds of calls,” said Sen. Jim DeMint (R-SC). The public is “significantly upset,” said Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA), adding that much of the outrage focused on children being searched. > > Pistole said he “understood” the concern (and he added that children under 12 weren’t subject to the enhanced pat-down). When one senator asked if this “understanding” meant changes were coming, Pistole was direct. “Am I going to change the policies? No.” So kids under 12 aren’t subject to the enhanced pat down? Great. Let’s play a game. Let’s say I’m a terrorist. I want to get a bomb on board an airplane. What this guy is saying is that all I need now is a kid under 12?

You think terrorists don’t have kids?

We can play this cat and mouse game all day long. There’s always going to be a loophole that any person with a brain can get around. As long as you have to make exceptions to rules, people will exploit those exceptions. So what’s the point of the game in the first place?

And what is it about turning 12 that suddenly makes it ok for the government to legally molest you?

Should we be randomly searched when walking into a grocery store? After all, we might have artfully concealed objects on us then, too. What’s so special about an airplane that warrants this extra scrutiny?

If you were a terrorist, wouldn’t you just blow up your bomb in the terminal? Or on a train? Or in a Wal-Mart?

But let’s get back to these “artfully concealed objects.” What were they, exactly? They weren’t bombs, obviously, or it would have been all over the news. So what are they finding? Hash pipes? Plastic baggies of pot? Are those things illegal? Yes. Are they a threat to an airplane? I don’t think so.

Objects aren’t the threat. People are the threat. A small group of determined people. We need to be looking for suspicious people, not objects. Metal detectors and X-ray scanners can’t detect intentions. You need human intelligence, highly-trained professional detectives.

And and ounce or two of common sense wouldn’t hurt, either.

You can find all the illegal contraband you want, until you catch an actual person who was actually trying to blow up a plane, you aren’t succeeding.

The underwear bomber was caught by intelligent civilian passengers who detected his suspicious behavior. If more intelligence and less machinery had been deployed prior to his lighting his pants on fire, he would have never made it onto the airplane in the first place.

But as usual, we learned the wrong lesson from that incident, just like we learned the wrong lesson from 9/11. We added more machinery, and paid even less attention to behavior.

Meanwhile, we have a living example of an airport in Tel Aviv that faces ten times the threat, doing security in a completely different fashion, with minimal inconvenience to passengers, a much more effective track record of catching actual threats, and it doesn’t cost as much. Until the TSA can explain to me why what we have is better, everything else is nonsense.