A Physicist's perspective on Airport Security

> There are two different philosophies. The Israeli view is that one looks for the perpetrator, not the tool or weapon. All passengers about to board a flight are interviewed. Many in this country erroneously describe the process as “profiling,” but I think a better description would be “triage.” The Israeli view is that one does not waste time and resources on passengers who do not pose any threat to safety and security. > > [How Israelis do air security](http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/01/11/yeffet.air.security.israel/index.html?iref=allsearch) > > Those doing the interviews are generally college graduates who have completed their military service and have had significant additional training. The key point is that they are trusted to use their discretion on how much to investigate any given passenger. This system clearly catches those dressed in a T-shirt, with no checked baggage who have bought a one-way ticket for travel to Detroit, Michigan, in midwinter! > > The Transportation Security Administration system in the United States relies on searching for the tool or weapon. Those doing the screening have no discretion and follow a ritual ordained from above. We have now reached the point where this method is unworkable. The main thrust of Rez’s argument, other than that the Israelis do security better, is that even if the small bombs that the scanners are meant to detect were to get onto a plane, setting them off would only cause maybe one or two casualties, and not take down the whole plane. Any bomb that you can hide on your person in this fashion is not powerful enough.

Now, that would be a tragedy, of course, if a few people died in one of these incidents, but considering how rare it would be for someone to attempt this, and considering how much more likely and easy it would be that someone could set off much more powerful explosives in other public places (subways, concerts, the security line of the airport itself), it makes no sense to go through this much effort in taxpayer money and inconvenience just to try and stop these small bombs from getting onto the airplane.

You have to draw a line of practicality somewhere, in other words. We drive every day, even though the highways are far more likely to kill you, because the need to get around outweighs the need to guarantee that every single car trip is not going to be fatal. The same is true for air travel.

You’re actually more likely to be killed by a mechanical failure, or a bird strike, than you are from one of these bombs when flying. So let’s stop pretending that the scanners are about security, and admit that they are about comforting the irrationally fearful. And then let’s educate those irrationally fearful people. That has to be cheaper and more effective all around.